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This chapter discusses inter-organizational relationships (IOR’s) from the perspective of innovation 
and learning. In such relations, transaction costs play an important role, but they need to be 
reconsidered from the perspective of learning.  
IOR’s are not new. They go back at least as far as Adam Smith’s argument for division of labour 
between firms, for the sake of productive efficiencies of specialization. Such specialization in firms by 
definition entails relations between firms, in outsourcing and collaboration. Renewed interest in IOR’s 
is due to recent developments in technology and markets. In technology, there is fast development and 
proliferation of novel opportunities, e.g. in information- and communication technology (ICT), micro-
mechanics, optics, sensors, their combination in robotization, biotechnology, new materials and 
surface technologies. In markets, there is renewed globalization
2
, partly as a result of new 
opportunities offered by ICT, for market entry and for coordinating activities across markets and 
organizations. As noted by Adam Smith, the extent of specialization and economy of scale is limited 
by the size of the market. Market extension by globalization thus furthers specialization and its 
consequent relations between firms. Furthermore, as a result of emerging complexity and rapid change 
of markets and technology, competition has increasingly become a ‘race to the market’ with new or 
improved products. To have any chance of winning such races, one needs to shed activities, as much 
as strategically possible, that are not part of the ‘core competencies’ (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) that 
constitute competitive advantage. Other, complementary competencies must then be sought from 
outside partners. Such outside sourcing also maximizes the flexibility in configurations of activities 
that is needed under rapid change. For example, in order to reduce development times of new products 
and to reduce risks of maladjustment to customer needs, suppliers should be brought in as a partner in 
developing and launching a new product.  
The sourcing decision -what to make and what to buy- is a special case of the more general 
decision what to do inside one’s own organization, and what to do outside, in collaboration with other 
organizations. Sourcing entails vertical collaboration, in the supply chain, including marketing and 
distribution. Relations may also be horizontal, with competitors, or lateral, with firms in other 
industries. Next to the question what to do inside or outside, and why, there are the questions with 
whom to collaborate, and how: in what forms of organization, in what networks, with what instruments 
for governance, and in what kind of process. 
In this chapter, it is not possible to address all these questions, and there is no need to duplicate the 
large literature on the subject of IOR’s (for a recent, integrated account, see Nooteboom 2004). This 
chapter focuses on one aspect that is still ill-developed in the literature: the combination of innovation 
and transaction costs. This chapter discusses the theoretical consequences of including innovation and 
learning, and implications for the boundaries of the firm, in particular for the choice between 
integration in a firm and alliances between firms, and for instruments for governing relational risk. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) needs to be modified and extended , since it offers at best 
comparative statics, and by its own admission (Williamson 1985: 143, 1999: 1103) does not, in its 
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 Parts of the text of this chapter were taken from Nooteboom (1999, 2003, 2004).  
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 Renewed, i.e. after the globalization that occurred in pre-WW1 imperialism.  
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established form, incorporate innovation and learning. This chapter combines a perspective of 
dynamic competencies, in learning and innovation, and a governance perspective, in the management 
of relational risk. While TCE neglects the competence side, studies of competence often neglect the 
governance side. For that, TCE still offers important insights in some causes and effects of relational 
risk (i.e. ‘hold-up risk’), and instruments for their governance.   
The competence perspective goes back to the work of Edith Penrose (1959). It emphasizes 
differences of competence between organizations. Competition is seen not only, and not even 
primarily, as competing on the price of a homogenous product, i.e. a product that can be closely 
substituted by users between different suppliers, but also, and primarily, as an attempt to maintain 
competencies that are scarce and difficult to imitate by potential competitors (Lippman and Rumelt 
1982), to achieve higher profit. Such variety among firms is also a crucial feature of evolutionary 
economics, with its explanatory triad of variety, selection and transmission. Variety among firms 
makes nonsense of analysing an industry on the basis of a ‘representative firm’.  
This chapter begins with a summary of standard TCE, followed by criticism, from the perspective 
of innovation and learning. For a transformation and extension of the theory, the chapter proceeds with 
the summary of a theory of knowledge and learning, derived from Nooteboom (2000). According to 
this theory, knowledge is constructed on the basis of mental categories that are formed in interaction 
with the environment. This develops into the notion of an organization as a ‘focusing device’, which 
yields an additional view on the boundaries of the firm, next to other views, including TCE. It also 
provides a cognitive argument for inter-organizational relations, next to the customary arguments that 
will be summarized later. Such relations serve to compensate for the organizational myopia that results 
from organizational focus. This perspective of learning has implications for the choice of the form of 
collaboration, and for the selection of instruments for the governance of relational risk, which deviate 
from TCE.  
 
Transaction cost economics 
 
Chiles and McMakin (1996) distinguished two perspectives in TCE. The first is a long-term evolutionary 
perspective, where objective transaction costs determine the survival of the fittest governance forms. The 
second is a short-term managerial choice perspective, where managers act on subjective costs that are 
based on a variety of perceptions and evaluations of risk. The latter explains why firms in similar 
circumstances may make different make-or-buy trade-offs. This chapter takes the latter perspective. 
The behavioural assumptions of TCE are that rationality is bounded and that people may be 
opportunistic. While people aim to be rational, their capacity to do so is limited, due to two types of 
uncertainty: behavioural uncertainty concerning the intentions and competencies of transaction partners 
and environmental uncertainty concerning conditions that may affect the execution of agreements and 
the outcomes of cooperation. As a result, closed contracts that foresee and regulate all possible 
eventualities are impossible. Not everybody is equally opportunistic, but the possibility of opportunism 
exists, and prior to a relation one does not know to what extent it may arise. Opportunism is defined as 
‘interest seeking with guile’. This includes actions against the interest of a partner, and against the letter 
or intent of an agreement, when the occasion presents itself, where necessary with the aid of lies or 
concealment of the truth. The opportunity for this follows from unpredictability of conditions and 
asymmetric information. 
 Williamson (1985: 1) defined a transaction as ‘transfer across a technologically separable interface’. 
This includes transfers within an organization. A transaction is an event that takes place during a process 
of exchange, in which the transaction has a past and a future. Here, I prefer to define the transaction as 
the moment at which agreement is established and ownership rights are transferred. Such rights include 
either claims to profit or decision rights, or both. When it is restricted to decision rights it can still apply 
within organizations.  
 In the process of exchange one can distinguish three stages, of what I call Contact, Contract and 
Control (Nooteboom 1999). Before the arrangement of a contract or other agreement arises one must 
find a transaction partner. This entails search costs on the part of the user and marketing costs on the part 
of the supplier. Search costs are associated with becoming aware of a need, and possibilities for fulfilling 
it, searching for fitting solutions and alternatives and their evaluation. Marketing costs form the mirror 
image of this: the research of latent or manifest needs among potential customers, possibilities to satisfy 
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them, development of specifications, tests and search for entry to customers. In the stage of Contract 
there are costs of preparing and concluding a contract or other type of agreement, as much as possible in 
anticipation of possible problems that might occur after transaction, in the stage of control. In the stage 
of Control there are costs of monitoring of the execution of the agreement, ‘haggling’ about it, problem 
solving, renegotiation and adjustment of the agreement, enforcement, and application of sanctions, 
litigation and possible loss of ‘specific investments’ and ‘hostages’ if the relation breaks. 
Costs of contract and control arise especially when parties become dependent upon each other due to 
costs of switching to a different partner. In particular, these obtain when the transaction entails ‘specific 
investments’ that are worth less or nothing outside the alliance (Williamson 1975), so that they would 
need to made anew with a different partner. 
 
 A classic example of a specific investment is the die in which a part of a car (door, hood) is 
stamped into shape. It has the shape of the part and is therefore as ‘specific’ as anything can get. 
It is also expensive because it is large and made of hard, durable material, to survive the force of 
stamping and maintain a constant shape. The investment in the die is not recouped until a large 
number of items has been stamped, and that requires a minimal volume or duration of produc-
tion. If production is stopped, the die has no more than scrap value.  
 
 Transaction specific investments can occur at both buyer and supplier. There are three kinds of 
transaction specific investments: ‘site specificity’, ‘physical asset specificity’, and ‘human asset specifi-
city’. Williamson further recognized the category of ‘dedicated assets’: expansion of capacity only to 
serve a given partner.  
 
 Some examples of site specificity are: infrastructural facilities (roads, pipes and ducts, homes, 
shops) for labourers of a remote mining facility; supply of heat from cooling water from a 
factory for heating of adjacent homes (due to rapid loss of heat in transport); a warehouse or 
production facility ‘at the doorstep’ of a customer, to provide ‘just in time’ supply. An example 
of human asset specificity is training dedicated to specific demands of the partner.  
 
 Transaction costs due to specific investments yield a reason for integrating activities within a single 
firm, which offers better control of opportunism and uncertainty (Williamson 1975), because of 
administrative fiat in obtaining information to judge actions and in imposing solutions, which goes far 
beyond what one could achieve in a court of law on the basis of a contract with an outside, independent 
partner. TCE predicts that there should and will be more integration to the extent that there are more 
specific investments and uncertainty is greater. 
 Integration can be achieved through sales of assets, a merger or acquisition, or an equity joint venture 
(In the following, ‘joint venture’ refers to ‘equity joint venture’). But a non-integrative, contractual 
alliance between different firms has advantages over integration: more ‘high-powered incentives’ in 
separate firms that are responsible for their own survival, economies of scale in production by 
specialized firms (Williamson, 1975), and greater flexibility in the configuration of complementary 
competencies or assets. However, such alliances raise complicated issues of ‘governance’, in ‘hybrid’ 
forms of organization ‘between market and hierarchy’ (Williamson 1991), to deal with the fiduciary risks 
of dependence and corresponding problems of coordination.  
 An important issue is the extent to which dependence due to specific investments is symmetric 
between partners. When a supplier engages in specific investments, this does not only make him 
dependent, but also his buyer, because when a break in supply occurs, the buyer will not have an 
immediate substitute of equal quality and cost. It will take an alternative supplier time to set up specific 
investments, and meanwhile the buyer will either face a discontinuity of supply or he will have to 
temporarily accept a product that does not fit his requirements, i.e. has lower quality. Also, apart from 
physical assets, a buyer will need to make adjustments in procedures, organization, knowledge to adapt 
to the specialized product, assets or competencies of the supplier, and these also constitute specific 
investments. At least he will have to invest in specific knowledge of the supplier's procedures, people 
involved, etc. However, there is no guarantee that dependence due to specific investments is symmetric. 
Generally, the weight of specific investments, in a variety of resources, including both physical and 
human resource assets, tends to be higher on the supplier's side.  
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 In IOR’s, there are several means to reduce the risk of one-sided dependence due to specific 
investments. One is to restrict opportunities for opportunism by contract, e.g. by forcing the partner to 
continue transactions until the cost of investment has been recouped. Another is to have the partner 
participate in the ownership of the investment. But to do this, the partner may in turn demand guarantees 
against the misuse of such guarantees, e.g. that the investment is indeed specific and is not used for 
transactions with others. There may also be an exchange of ‘hostages’, defined as things that are of value 
only to the giver and not the keeper, so that the latter will not hesitate to destroy the hostage when the 
hostage giver reneges on his commitment. Often, a hostage takes the form of sensitive information from 
or about a partner that would cause damage when destroyed or leaked the partner’s competitors. Another 
instrument is to reduce the partner’s incentives or inclination to utilize opportunities for opportunism. 
These can impinge on the partner’s self-interest, or on his sense of loyalty. This may include reputation 
effects: if the partner gets known to be unreliable, it will jeopardize future transactions. 
 Generally the cost and delay of setting up and maintaining elaborate schemes of governance between 
two partners (‘bilateral governance’) are substantial. When the transaction involved is small or 
infrequent, the benefit is not worth the cost, and one will prefer to keep contracts simple and engage a 
trusted third party to act as an arbitrator (‘trilateral governance’). The classic example is an architect who 
arbitrates in transactions between a builder and a supplier of building materials. 
 A relatively minor point of criticism of TCE is that the theory would be more consistent in taking the 
relation rather than the transaction as the unit of analysis. The essential notion of the ‘fundamental 
transformation’ from ‘large to small numbers bargaining’, as a result of specific investments, requires it. 
The issue is, precisely, that an investment, made to conduct any transaction at all, is tied to a transaction 
partner, and thereby requires ongoing transactions in that particular relationship.  
 Another relatively minor point of criticism of TCE is that it suggests that specific products require 
specific investments: that when one tailors a product to special needs one needs to make investments that 
can cater only to those specialized needs. However, to the extent that technology is flexible an 
investment can, by definition, be used to produce a range of differentiated products (Nooteboom 1993a). 
For example, a programmable workbench for machining metal can yield parts of a variety of shapes and 
functions, without the operator needing to adapt his skill. Software for designing and testing virtual 
prototypes of machines, cars or airplanes by means of computer simulation yields much greater 
flexibility for a range of different designs than old-fashioned physical prototypes subjected to ‘real’ 
testing (such as testing the aerodynamic properties of a car in a wind tunnel). 
 A more fundamental point of criticism is that TCE neglects effects of the embeddedness of relations 
in wider networks, as studied in sociology. However, that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Two 
other fundamental points of criticism concern the lack of innovation and learning in TCE, and its neglect 
of trust. These are of particular interest from a neo-Schumpeterian view, and are discussed below. 
 
Innovation and learning 
 
As Williamson (1985, p.143) himself admitted: ‘..the study of economic organisation in a regime of 
rapid innovation poses much more difficult issues than those addressed here’. Williamson (1999) 
claimed that he fully accepts bounded rationality: there is fundamental uncertainty concerning future 
contingencies. However, he claims, there is foresight: one can take such uncertainty into account, infer 
the hazards that follow from it and conduct governance accordingly (in a ‘discriminating alignment’) 
and ‘efficiently’, i.e. in an optimal fashion (to yield an ‘economizing result’). We are not myopic, 
Williamson claims: we are not so stupid as not to take uncertainties into account when we design 
governance. And indeed, we can to some extent take risks and uncertainty into account. Firms can 
spread risks by participating in different markets, in the same way that investors can spread risks in a 
portfolio of investments. Beyond that, to deal with real or radical uncertainty, we can construct 
scenarios of possible futures, prepare contingency plans for them, and identify the robustness of 
strategies across different scenarios. Shell Oil Company, for example, developed this in the seventies, 
in anticipation of oil crises. 
Scholars in the competence perspective do not assume myopia, as Williamson accuses them of 
doing. However, they ask, as TCE does not, what the implications of bounded rationality are for the 
correct identification of relevant hazards. Bounded rationality implies that we might be mistaken about 
them. Williamson (1999: 1103) admits that TCE ‘makes only limited contact with the subject of 
 5
learning’, and indicates that we may be mistaken about hazards and may learn about them as events 
unfold (1999: 1104). And apart from hazards there are new options. In spite of great imagination and 
ingenuity, the scenario’s we invented may not include what actually arises. Also, preferences may 
shift. That is part of learning. And if new insights in hazards arise, new scenario’s, or new options or 
goals, are we then able to shift from the governance structure engaged upon to an adapted, optimal 
form? That would always be possible only if there is no path-dependence or lock-in in governance, 
and that is a strong claim to make. 
This is related to the issue of ‘efficient’, optimal outcomes. Williamson’s argument is that 
‘dysfunctional consequences and other long run propensities will not be mindlessly repeated or 
ignored’ (Williamson 1999: 1105). But the argument begs a number of questions. It implies that dys-
functionality and long run propensities are stable, so that experience in the past is indicative of the 
future. There is no guarantee that this is the case. Indeed, in innovation and learning it is not, almost 
by definition. And if we could correctly adapt our foresight, how can we be sure that the firm survives 
to implement the lesson in time? TCE seems to fall back on the notion of selection: inefficient forms 
of organisation will be selected out by ‘the market’. That is the usual assumption behind the 
economist’s assumption of efficient outcomes, going back to Alchian (1950). But if that is 
Williamson’s argument, he is deviating from the perspective of the firm strategist, who is talking 
about the survival of the firm (Chiles and McMakin, 1996). Furthermore, the selection argument was 
already shown to be weak by Winter (1964). In selection it is not the best possible but the best 
available in the population that survives. In the presence of economy of scale inefficient large firms 
may push out efficient small firms, and thus inefficiency may survive. Furthermore, efficient selection 
cannot be taken for granted in view of possible monopolies, entry barriers and transaction costs. 
Williamson claims that his theory is inter-temporal, incorporating the passage of time, and indeed 
he claims that this is central to TCE (1999: 1101). And indeed, up to a point it does incorporate inter-
temporality. It makes a distinction between ex ante considerations, before commitment of transaction 
specific investments, and ex post considerations, after their commitment. This yields the ‘fundamental 
transformation’ from multiple to ‘small numbers’ of options. The theory also is inter-temporal in the 
sense of taking uncertainty concerning future contingencies into account, as discussed in the previous 
section. However, TCE does not go far enough and, again, is not consistent in this. Williamson (1999: 
1101) does claim that ‘governance structures are predominantly instruments for adaptation, it being 
the case that adaptation ... is the central problem of economic organisation; organisation has an inter-
temporal life of its own ...’. He admits, however, that this ‘is not to say that it (TCE) has worked all of 
these out in a satisfactory way. I entirely agree that transaction cost economics stands to benefit from 
more fully dynamic constructions. But whereas saying dynamics is easy, doing dynamics is hard’. 
This is in line with Williamson’s other admission, quoted above, that learning is not well developed in 
TCE. Nowadays innovation and learning are crucial, and should be in the core of theory.  
 TCE appears to adhere to a naive theory of knowledge and competence, with the assumption that 
technology is accessible more or less ‘from the shelf’, to anyone who pays its price. However, firms may 
need to contract some good or service from outside simply because it is not itself capable of providing it, 
or may need to produce it itself because no one else has the resources needed. Furthermore, to 
understand what others firms supply, to evaluate it and to incorporate it in internal activities, requires 
appropriate ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). A deeper, cognitive issue arises from the 
theory of knowledge employed in this chapter, which will be outlined in the next section.   
 
Cognitive distance and organizational focus 
 
After criticism of TCE, attention now turns to ways to mend its shortcomings. Here, attention turns to 
innovation and learning. Diversity is a crucial condition for learning and innovation, to produce 
Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’, as demonstrated in evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 
1982). Diversity is associated with the number of agents (people, firms) with different knowledge 
and/or skills, who are involved in a process of learning or innovation by interaction. However, next to 
the number of agents involved, a second dimension of diversity is the degree to which their knowledge 
or skills are different. This yields the notion of  ‘cognitive distance’, based on a constructivist, 
interactionist view of knowledge (Mead 1934, Berger and Luckmann 1967, Weick 1979, 1995, 
Nooteboom 2000). According to this view, people perceive, interpret, understand and evaluate the 
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world according to mental categories (or cognitive frames, or models, cf. Johnson-Laird 1983), which 
they have developed in interaction with their physical and social environment. As a result, people see 
and know the world differently to the extent that their cognition has developed in different conditions 
(national, regional and organizational culture, customs/habits, social norms/values, education, 
technologies, markets). This yields the notion of cognitive distance, and the notion of a firm as a 
‘focusing device’, as part of a ‘cognitive theory of the firm’, proposed by Nooteboom (2000). This 
view can be seen as harking back to Austrian perspectives of the firm (Menger, von Mises, von 
Hayek), with attention to problems of learning, localized knowledge, and the market as a ‘discovery 
process’. The key features of the theory are summarized below. 
Here, cognition is to be seen in a broad sense, including not only rational evaluation but also 
emotion-laden value judgements, and heuristics of attribution, inference and decision-making that we 
know from social psychology (Bazerman 1998, Tversky and Kahneman 1983). In a firm, people need 
to achieve a common purpose, and for this they need some more or less tacit shared ways of seeing 
and interpreting the world. In view of incentive problems, in monitoring and control, especially in 
contemporary organizations of more or less autonomous professionals, and the desire for intrinsic next 
to extrinsic motives (Frey 2002), people in organizations also need to share more or less tacit values 
and norms, to align objectives, govern relational risk and to provide a basis for conflict resolution. Due 
to uncertainty concerning contingencies of collaboration, and limited opportunities for monitoring, ex 
ante measures of governance are seldom complete, and need to be supplemented with ex-post 
adaptation. Organizational focus, provided by organizational culture, yields an epistemological and 
normative ‘substrate’ to achieve this, as basis for shared processes of attribution, mutual adaptation 
and decision-making. In other words, cognitive distance needs to be restricted for the sake of 
coordination. Organizational culture incorporates fundamental views and intuitions regarding the 
relation between the firm and its environment, attitude to risk, the nature of knowledge, the nature of 
man and of relations between people, which inform content and process of strategy, organizational 
structure, and styles of decision-making and coordination (Schein 1985). One aspect of 
entrepreneurship, which links with Schumpeter’s notion of the entrepreneur as a charismatic figure, is 
that it is his central task to achieve this: to align perceptions, understandings, goals and motives.
3
 
Note that the notion of focus does not entail the need for people to agree on everything, or see 
everything the same way. Indeed, such lack of diversity would prevent both division of labour and 
innovation within the firm. However, there are some things they may have to agree on, and some 
views they need to share, on goals, norms, values and ways of doing things.   
Organizational focus needs to be tight, in the sense of allowing for little ambiguity and variety of 
meanings and standards, if the productive system of a firm, for the sake of exploitation, is ‘systemic’, 
as opposed to ‘stand–alone’ (Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Exploitation is systemic when there is a 
complex division of labor, with many elements and a dense structure of relations between them, with 
tight constraints on their interfaces. An example is an oil refinery. In more stand-alone systems, 
elements of the system are connected with few other elements, and connections are loose, allowing for 
some ambiguity and deviation from standards on interfaces. An example is a consultancy firm. An 
intermediate system, between systemic and stand-alone, is a modular system. Here, there are also 
multiple, connected elements, as in the systemic case, but the standards on interfaces allow for variety, 
where different modules can be plugged into the system. 
Organizational focus yields a risk of myopia (in ‘group think’): relevant opportunities and threats 
to the firm are not seen. To compensate for this, firms need outside contacts for ‘external economy of 
cognitive scope’ (Nooteboom 1992). On the basis of different experiences, with different technologies 
and different markets, and different organizational histories, in other words at some cognitive distance, 
outside firms perceive, interpret and understand phenomena differently, and this may compensate for 
organizational myopia. This yields a new purpose for inter-organizational alliances, next to the usual 
considerations, known from the alliance literature, such as economies of scale and scope, risk 
spreading, complementarity of competence, flexibility, setting market standards, and speed and 
efficiency of market entry. 
                                                     
3
 Related to this, perhaps, Adam Smith recognized ‘authority’ next to utility, in politics and 
organization, to establish allegiance to joint goals, as discussed by Khalil (2002).  
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The different foci of firms entail cognitive distance between firms. In processes of learning and 
innovation, in interaction between firms, this yields both an opportunity and a problem. The 
opportunity lies in diversity: the novelty value of a relation increases with cognitive distance. 
However, mutual understanding decreases with cognitive distance. If effectiveness of learning by 
interaction is the mathematical product of novelty value and understandability, the result is an inverse-
U shaped relation with cognitive distance. Optimal cognitive distance lies at the maximum of the 
curve. This is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------- 
 
In Figure 1, the downward sloping line represents understandability, on the basis of ‘absorptive 
capacity’. The upward sloping line represents the novelty value of a relation. The optimal level of 
cognitive distance from a learning perspective lies in-between very low and very high levels of 
cognitive distance. Absorptive capacity is not fixed. It may be raised, and then, as illustrated in figure 
1, optimal cognitive distance increases, together with the innovative output of collaboration. For more 
codified knowledge, absorptive capacity may be raised by R&D, and for more tacit knowledge it may 
be raised by cumulative experience in communication with people who think differently. Note that, 
due to the integration, in cognition, of both rationality and emotion-laden value judgements, cognitive 
distance also includes differences in goals and in attitudes towards organization, fair dealing, and the 
like.  
Wuyts et. al. (2005) put the hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance to two empirical tests. The 
first test was conducted on a combination of the basic hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance with 
the second hypothesis that cognitive distance decreases with increased frequency and duration of 
interaction. This yields the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relation between radical technological 
innovation and the extent to which firms ally with the same partners over time. That hypothesis was 
tested on data on vertical alliances between biotech and pharma companies, and was supported. The 
second test was conducted on a combination of the basic hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance with 
a second hypothesis that the likelihood of a collaborative alliance increases with the expected 
performance of collaborative innovation. This yielded the derived hypothesis that the likelihood of an 
alliance for innovation has an inverted U-shaped relation with cognitive distance. That hypothesis was 
tested on data on horizontal alliances in ICT industries. Partial support was found. Technology-related 
measures of cognitive distance were not found to have any significant effect, but several indicators of 
differences in firms’ organizational characteristics proved to have the expected inverted U-shaped 
effect. Three considerations were offered to explain why organizational aspects turned out to be more 
important than technological ones in ICT industries. First, as indicated in the earlier theoretical 
discussion, when a technology is systemic, as is the case in ICT, then, almost by definition, 
organizational issues are more important than in the case of stand-alone technology, as in 
biotechnology. Second, in the ICT case the alliances are horizontal, and there the threat of mutual 
competition between alliance partners is higher than in vertical alliances, as in the pharma-biotech 
case. That requires more attention to issues of governance and organization. Third, according to 
innovation theory there is a cycle of innovation, where, after a stage of volatility, technology 
converges on a ‘dominant design’. Then demand and competition increase, and attention shifts to 
organization for commercialization (market entry, access to distribution channels) and efficient 
production, which may in turn lead to a dominant design in organization (Abernathy 1978, Abernathy 
and Clark 1985, Abernathy and Utterback 1978). ICT industries are largely in that stage of shifting 




TCE has been ambiguous about trust. In his 1975 book, Williamson employed the notion of 
‘atmosphere’, which comes close, it appears, to trust. In his 1985 book trust is not dealt with. Later, 
Williamson (1993) faced the issue squarely and asked a very good, challenging question: Does trust go 
beyond calculative self-interest? If it does not, it adds nothing to existing economic analysis. If it does, 
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it entails blind trust and that is inadvisable in market relations, outside relations of family or 
friendship. In markets it will not survive. Thus, Williamson argued, whichever way you look at it, trust 
can be discarded. In his 1999 article Williamson suggests that scholars in the competence perspective 
‘presume the absence of opportunism ...(and thereby)  .. enter the world of utopian fantasies’. Of 
course, those scholars are not that naive. They accept the possibility of opportunism but they reject 
Williamson’s neglect of trust.  
TCE does not assume that everyone is equally opportunistic, but that prior to a transaction one can 
have no reliable information about one’s partner’s degree of opportunism, and therefore one has to 
assume opportunism, as a basis for governance, to avoid the hazard involved. Williamson (1985: 59) 
argued as follows: ‘inasmuch as a great deal of the relevant information about trustworthiness or its 
absence that is generated during the course of bilateral trading is essentially private information - in 
that it cannot be fully communicated to and shared with others (Williamson 1975: 31-37) - knowledge 
about behavioural uncertainties is very uneven.’ This may be so. But it yields insufficient argument to 
ignore trust. Why should it be easy to incorporate trust? Even if it is difficult, disregarding it may be 
worse.  
When Williamson argues for the assumption of opportunism, he does not seem to be aware of the 
price one pays for that. It leads one to possibly costly contracting. Due to economies of scale in 
transaction costs it is especially costly for or with regard to small firms (Nooteboom, 1993b). What is 
worse, such a contract might seriously constrain the freedom and open-endedness of action that is 
crucial especially when the collaboration is aimed at innovation and the development of new 
competencies. Even worse than that, the expression of distrust, based on the assumption of 
opportunism, is likely to destroy the basis for building up trust as the relation unfolds. There is much 
evidence in the trust literature that distrust breeds distrust and may even elicit opportunism. Then the 
assumption of opportunism may become self-fulfilling, with considerable costs of contracting and loss 
of perspective for a fruitful relationship. 
At some level trust is inevitable. Markets could not work without non-calculative trust. Complete 
lack of trust beyond calculative self-interest would prevent one from entering any relation and would 
thereby deprive one from evidence that may contradict mistrust. Absence of trust would yield an 
infinite regress of seeking safeguards for the hazards involved in ambiguity concerning the terms of 
safeguards. Such ambiguity is inevitable: even legal language does not yield complete lack of 
ambiguity. No language can. It has been recognised by others that even if all relevant contingencies 
were known, there will still be incompleteness of contracts because of ‘bounded writing and 
communication skills’ (Hart 1990: 699) and the fact that ‘language would not be rich and precise 
enough to describe all the eventualities’ (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 129). On the other hand, too 
much trust will be corrected by experience that invalidates it. The question now is what the basis for 
‘genuine’ trust might be.  
There is a vast literature on trust that cannot fully be discussed here (for a survey, see Nooteboom, 
2002). There is a widespread view that trust, in a wide sense, includes elements of control or 
‘deterrence’, including both legal coercion and control by incentives and dependence, as well as 
elements that go beyond control, as a basis for ‘goodwill’ or ‘benevolence’ (see e.g. the special issue 
of Organization Studies on ‘Trust and control in organizational relations’, 22/2, 2001).
 
As noted by 
Maguire et. al. (2001: 286), if we do not include the latter, we conflate trust and power. The first 
(control or deterrence) is part of calculative self-interest, but the latter (benevolence) is not. Many 
authors feel that control is foreign to the notion of trust, and that ‘genuine’ trust is based on other, 
more social and personal foundations of trustworthiness. This is in accordance with Williamson’s view 
that the notion of trust is meaningful (in what we called ‘genuine trust’) only if it goes beyond 
calculative self-interest. Therefore, trust has been defined as the expectation that a partner will not 
engage in opportunistic behaviour, even in the face of countervailing short-term opportunities and 
incentives (Bradach and Eccles 1984, Chiles and McMackin 1996, Nooteboom 1996). 
There are several foundations of trust beyond calculative self-interest. One lies in norms and values 
concerning decent behaviour, or ethics, which constrain opportunism. Within firms, this is part of the 
culture of a firm, as part of its focus, as indicated before. In several writings, Williamson seemed to 
acknowledge, often implicitly, that norms of behaviour are part of the institutional environment, or of 
the institutional arrangements of firms. But how does this square with his 1993 rejection of trust that 
goes beyond calculative self-interest? If norms of behaviour are conducive to trust, are they then part 
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of calculative self-interest? Norms of behaviour are not calculative, selected rationally, but are socially 
inculcated, and form part of tacit, unreflective principles of behaviour. They go beyond utility.  
 Williamson (1993) explicitly rejected other foundations of genuine trust, such as loyalty based on 
empathy, identification, friendship, and reciprocity. Those, he claimed, should be reserved for friends 
and family only. But, inevitably, such social-psychological phenomena also play a role in business 
relations. Furthermore, one can learn to trust and be trustworthy, in a way that is not blind or irrational. 
Here, the lack of learning in TCE connects with its lack of trust.  
 As a transaction relation unfolds in time, one can accumulate more or less reliable information about 
trustworthiness. And such experience can be communicated in reputation mechanisms. The 
sociological literature gives extensive instructions how to infer intentional trustworthiness from 
observed behaviour (Deutsch 1973). Did the partner act not only according to the letter but also to the 
spirit of the agreement? Did he give timely warnings about unforeseen changes or problems? Was he 
open about relevant contingencies, and truthful about his dealings with others who might constitute a 
threat to oneself? Did he defect to more attractive alternatives at the earliest opportunity? Or to use 
Hirschman’s (1970) notions of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’: how much voice rather than exit did he exhibit? 
Furthermore, the literature on trust indicates the possibility that in interaction partners may get to 
understand each other better, which enables a better judgement of trustworthiness, in ‘knowledge 
based trust’. In ongoing interaction they may first develop insight in each other’s cognitive frames, in 
empathy. This does not entail that they always agree. There may be sharp disagreements, but those are 
combined with a willingness to express and discuss them more or less openly, in ‘voice’, extending 
mutual benefit of the doubt. As a result, conflicts may deepen the relationship rather than breaking it. 
Next, partners may develop shared cognitive frames, by which they may identify with each other's 
goals, in ‘identification based trust’, with understanding or even sympathy for weaknesses and 
mistakes (McAllister 1995, Lewicki and Bunker 1996).  
Another, though related, basis for trusting behaviour lies in routinization (Nooteboom 1996, 
Nooteboom et. al. 1997). Herbert Simon a long time ago showed that routines have survival value 
because they reserve our scarce capacity of ‘focal awareness’ in rational, calculative thought, for 
conditions that are new and demand priority. When things go well for a while in a relationship, one 
tends to take at least some of it for granted. One may no longer think of opportunities for opportunism 
open to a partner, or to oneself. And it seems rather odd to call routines calculative. How can 
something that is subconscious be calculative? I proposed (Nooteboom 2002) that on the basis of 
experience in relations, trustworthiness is assumed until evidence to the contrary emerges. In other 
words, trust is a ‘default’. The possibility of opportunism is relegated to ‘subsidiary awareness’ 
(Polanyi 1962).  
In spite of all this, surely Williamson was right in his warning of the dangers of trust that becomes 
blind. However, he went overboard when stating that authors in the competence perspective ‘presume 
the absence of opportunism ...(and thereby)  .. enter the world of utopian fantasies’ (Williamson 1999). 
Most authors in the competence perspective do not wish to suggest either that there is no threat of 
opportunism, or that self-interest or control are absent, or that altruism and goodwill operate 
independently from it. The relation between the two is a subject for extensive debate. As noted by 
Bachmann (in Lane and Bachmann 2000: 303), trust is a hybrid phenomenon, including both 
calculation and goodwill. Trust can work without becoming unconditional, which would indeed be 
unwise, as Williamson suggests. While trust is not always calculative, it is constrained by possibilities 
of opportunism (Pettit 1995). 
One way to model trustworthiness is in terms of a limited resistance to temptation towards 
opportunism. This may be modelled as a threshold for defection: one does not opportunistically defect 
until the advantage one can gain with it exceeds the threshold.
4
 This threshold depends on the wider 
cultural environment, the narrower cultural environment of a firm one works for, personal upbringing, 
and personal relations. It is likely to adapt as a function of experience. It also depends on pressures of 
competition and survival. In competitive markets trustworthiness will be less than in more protected 
ones. Trust may then be modelled as based on an assumption, perception or inference of such a 
(limited) resistance to temptation of opportunism. Within that limit, one can economize on contracting. 
                                                     
4
 This feature has been included in an agent-based computational model of the build-up and break-
down of trust in buyer-supplier relations (Klos and Nooteboom 2001). 
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When temptation becomes too large, trust is likely to make way for calculation. So even though trust 
is and should be limited, since indeed unconditional trust is unwise, within the margin of perceived or 
assumed trustworthiness it can save on contracting. 
Routines are not unconditional, unless they have sunk so deeply into our nature that they have 
become instincts. Generally, when something out of the ordinary occurs, our awareness shifts from 
subsidiary to ‘focal’ and we look critically at what is going on. As Simon (1983) pointed out, we need 
emotions of danger and excitement to catapult us into focal awareness. In relations of voice, we must 
next control emotions to give the partner the benefit of the doubt, rather than immediately assume the 
worst. Thus, routine behaviour is not necessarily blind, or more accurately: it is not unconditional. 
Does this triggering back into focal awareness, then, make routines calculative? Again: can subsidiary 
awareness be called calculative? And can emotional triggering be called calculative?  
Nooteboom et. al. (1997) conducted an empirical test of explanations of perceived relational risk of 
suppliers, on the basis of TCE variables and variables relating to non-calculative trust. Both 
explanations were confirmed, showing that TCE and non-TCE variables can be complementary. The 
TCE variables were: specific investments, mutual dependence, legal and private ordering. The trust 
variables, beyond TCE, were: the development of joint norms of behaviour, and routinization. The test 





The inclusion of learning and trust leads on to further extensions of TCE.  
 One extension is effects of scale in transaction costs. Transaction costs differ between large and small 
firms. There are effects of scale on both sides of a transaction relation: a small firm as supplier and as a 
customer (Nooteboom 1993b). Transaction costs, in all stages of  contact, contract and control, are 
higher for a small firm due to a lack of staff support in marketing, legal matters, personnel, finance and 
accounting. The set-up costs of governance are high relative to the size of the transaction. Therefore, in 
relations with small firms, use will more often be made of an outside arbitrator or mediator to settle 
conflicts, instead of detailed contracts and formal procedural agreements (‘trilateral governance’). Costs 
of monitoring and control are higher due to a greater tacitness of knowledge: there are fewer formal, 
documented sources of information, which makes small firms more inscrutable. One needs to extract the 
required information from the minds of people, or deduce it from their actions. That is also why small 
firms are often unattractive customers for consultants. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that small 
firms are more diverse than large ones (Nooteboom 1994).
5
 The inscrutability and diversity of small 
firms yield problems in the stages of contract and control. There is less formal documentation as a basis 
for contracts or other agreements and for monitoring compliance with them. Note that here there is a 
double effect. First, there is an effect of scale in setting up a contract and a monitoring system. Second, 
there is less documented information available for it. Given a certain volume per transaction, a smaller 
firm has fewer transaction partners, and therefore less spread of relational risk. One can try to improve 
this by taking a larger number of partners, with a smaller transaction per partner, but that is often not 
attractive due to effects of scale in transactions, due to minimum set-up costs of contact, contract and 
control indicated above. A small firm may also burden his partner with a greater risk of discontinuity due 
to default, because due to a smaller spread of commercial risk across multiple products and markets 
default risk is higher for smaller firms. Small firms may also raise the suspicion that they are 
                                                     
5
 First, as a motivational or ‘final’ cause, they have more diverse goals of entrepreneurship: not 
necessarily maximum profit or growth, but also independence, going their own way, maintenance of a 
traditional life or way of doing things, staying small and informal or wanting to try out things which are 
rejected in large firms. Second, as a conditional cause which makes this possible, small firms exist more 
on private capital and are therefore less subject to the rigours and criteria of success imposed by capital 
markets. Connected with this, they are not subjected to an outside supervisory board. These factors leave 
more room for idiosyncratic goals and ways of doing things. 
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opportunistically engaging in ‘hit and run’: going for a fast profit with an unreliable or bad quality 
product, or a product without future support, and leave the market when the damage becomes evident.
6
  
In an extended theory of transactions, there are also two extensions of the notion of specific 
investments. One is the investment in mutual understanding, needed to cross cognitive distance, in the 
building of mutual empathy, i.e. understanding of a partner’s cognition. This may to large extent be 
relation-specific. Related to this, the second extension is the building of relation-specific trust, by 
mutual understanding, which helps to identify limits of trustworthiness, in different respects 
(competence, benevolence), under different conditions. As discussed, an issue concerning trust is the 
relation between personal and organizational trust. In IOR’s, one needs to trust both the organization, 
in both its competence and intentions to support and guide the conduct of its people, and the 
competence and intentions of the people one deals with. The two are connected by the roles that 
people have in organizations.
7
 It takes time and effort to get to know all this, and to develop coherent 
individual and organizational trust. Especially for small suppliers to large firms, this may entail a very 
high and highly relation-specific investment, relative to the volume of trade involved. 
Another extension is the inclusion of spillover risk next to the hold-up risk analysed by TCE. 
Spillover risk is the risk that knowledge that forms part of competitive advantage is absorbed and used 
for competition by partners, in direct or indirect relationships. For an assessment of this risk one 
should, first of all, take into account that the questions should not be only how much knowledge spills 
over outwards but also how much spills over inwards, and what the net advantage is. Spillover risk 
further depends on a number of contingencies (Nooteboom 1999). Tacit knowledge spills over less 
easily than codified knowledge. Whether spillover matters for competition depends on the absorptive 
capacity of potential competitors, i.e. their ability to understand what they see (taking into account 
‘causal ambiguity’), and, after that, to implement knowledge for effective competition, given 
organizational focus. Finally, if by the time all that has happened the knowledge involved has 
changed, one would not care. These considerations are of great importance for the structure and 
governance of IOR’s, as will be shown later.           
 
Boundaries of the firm 
 
Rom the beginning of TCE (Coase 1937), a core question concerned the purpose and the boundaries of 
the firm. Different answers are reviewed here. They are not necessarily substitutes, and can well 
complement each other. For example, cognitive and transaction cost arguments may be combined. To 
answer such questions, let us first consider some key features of organization. 
The basic features of an organization include a structure of elements (subsidiaries, divisions, teams, 
individual people) that have resources and repertoires of action (competencies), with decision rules 
that govern choice from those repertoires, to achieve goals, in coordination (which includes 
governance) between those elements. Coordination is needed to the extent that elements are connected, 
i.e. their actions, in both their selection and performance, depend on each other. The position that an 
element has in a structure, i.e. its pattern of ties with other elements, constitutes its role in the 
organization (Nooteboom and Bogenrieder 2002). Note that there may be different levels of 
repertoires, including those for the development of repertoires (learning). In organizations, many 
actions and decision rules or heuristics are routinized, and may have a large tacit component. In other 
words, they constitute organizational routines (Nelson and Winter 1982). Decision rules may or may 
not be rationally designed, and they incorporate decision heuristics from social psychology. Goals also 
may be largely tacit. Different elements in the organization may or may not know or understand some 
or all of each other’s actions and repertoires, and may or may not agree on each others’ goals. In other 
                                                     
6
 This is more probable for small than for large firms, who have invested more in reputation, face wider 
consequences of reputational damage, across products and markets, in a larger portfolio, and find it more 
difficult to hide after they run. In other words: small firms may lack the discipline of reputation. To 
eliminate suspicion, the small firm may need to demonstrate that it is committed to the longer term, 
vulnerable to reputational loss, and it may need to point to the existence of exacting partners who can be 
expected to be critical and competent in judging the reliability of the small firm. 
7
 This is connected, for example, with the notion of the ‘buy group’ in industrial (B to B) marketing: 
the different people involved in a buy decision, and their distribution of power and competence. 
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words, there may be differences in semantics and values, and some of those may even be 
irreconcilable. However that may be, it was argued above that an organization requires a certain 
‘focus’, of some shared views of the world, goals and ways of doing things, in order to function and 
survive as a collective. This focus may be wide, allowing for much diversity, or narrow, depending on 
a variety of conditions. In other words, an organization puts limits, somewhere, to cognitive diversity.  
There are a number of familiar arguments for the existence of organizations. A legal argument for 
organization derives from the need for a legal identity of a group of people working together, to 
regulate ownership of assets, conditions of employment, liability and accountability. In the literature 
on IOR’s, there are claims that boundaries of firms are blurring, in forms of organization ‘between 
market and hierarchy’. This is correct in the sense that in IOR’s forms of governance extend across 
boundaries of the firm, in forms of semi-integration. In the legal sense, however, boundaries remain 
clear (Hodgson 2002). In other words, boundaries of organization as forms of co-ordination do indeed 
blur, but boundaries of organizations as legal entities do not. The legal argument does not, however, 
specify what activities have to be combined in an organization, and why. 
Economics has given a variety of arguments for integrating different activities in an organization. 
One is technical: when complementary activities are technically inseparable, they need to be integrated 
by definition. A second type of economic theory derives from the need to align incentives in 
complementary activities, in the face of possible problems of monitoring, due to asymmetric 
information. One branch of that theory is ‘principal-agent’ theory. That will not be used in this 
chapter, because it puts the analysis of collaboration on the wrong foot, with its assumption that there 
is a clear, independent principal (‘boss’) on one side, and a dependent agent on the other side, who is 
driven to satisfy the demands of the principal. In IOR’s, dependence and power are often not balanced, 
but nevertheless, in collaboration agents are to be seen as each others’ principals and agents at the 




Another branch of this type of economic theory is transaction cost economics, as discussed above. 
According to this theory, boundaries of the firm arise from a trade-off between on the one hand costs 
of contact, contract and control, which are higher outside than inside a firm, and advantages of scale 
and motivation in outside, independent, specialized production.  
In this chapter, a new, cognitive, argument is offered, as discussed above. Organizations need a 
cognitive focus, which entails a danger of myopia, which is to be mended by access to complementary 
cognition from outside partners, at optimal cognitive distance (‘external economy of cognitive scope’). 
Organizational boundaries are determined by the tightness of organizational focus, which depends on 
several conditions (Nooteboom 2000). One condition is the relation between exploitation and 
exploration, and the position in this that is chosen by the firm. Exploration requires a wider focus, and 
exploitation a narrower one. How difficult it is to combine the two in one organization depends on 
how systemic vs. stand-alone exploitation is. Highly systemic exploitation yields problems in allowing 
for the wider scope needed for exploration. One may specialize in either exploitation or exploration, 
and ‘outsource’ the other in IOR’s. The notion of focus is related to the notion of ‘core competence’ 
from the business literature (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). That notion refers to competencies in which a 
firm can distinguish itself from competitors, to make profit from specialties that cannot easily be 
imitated. It is meant to go beyond existing capabilities, to include the ability to develop new ones. The 
notion also seems similar to that of organizational routines, on different levels, indicated above.  
In much of the business literature on IOR’s, opinion seems to have settled on a rather extreme view 
in favour of outsourcing everything that is not part of ‘core competencies’. However, that may go too 
far.
9
 The question of course is what, exactly, is to be seen as part of core competence, and what is 
meant by the qualification, given above, that one should outsource as much as ‘strategically possible’. 
When is something not to be outsourced even if it is not part of core competence? 
 
                                                     
8
 Such a perspective is usually taken, also, in theories of corporate governance, with shareholders in 
the seat of the principal.  Taking that approach, one fixes shareholder value as the basic value of firms 
from the start. One can also take a more balanced view of different ‘stakeholders’, in a balancing of 
their interests (Nooteboom 1999b).  
9
 Teece 1986, Bettis et. al. 1992, Chesbrough and Teece 1996. 
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 Philips Company is a user of chips (semi-conductors) as components in many kinds of consumer 
electronics. A compact disc player, for example, requires a combination of mechanics, laser 
technology, electro-technology, control technology and informatics. Should Philips make its 
own chips, or contract them from specialist producers? The production of chips entails high tech 
surface technology, to affect, at a microscopic level, the conducting properties of a silicon disc 
by means of sophisticated physical and chemical processes. That does not seem to fit with 
Philips’ core competencies. So, according to the maxim of sticking to core competencies it 
seems reasonable to have it contracted out. But there are strategic complications. The first is that 
the world-class producers of chips are the same Japanese companies that compete with Philips in 
the market for consumer electronics. Should one become dependent for supply on one’s main 
competitors? The second complication is that the development of technology and markets is 
very rapid, and new products often arise from novel combinations of existing technologies, and 
often one needs to react fast to novel opportunities. The ‘window of opportunity’ is narrow and 
passes fast. For this reason one may need to maintain competence in an area that in a static 
situation one should surrender. The production of semiconductors requires sophisticated (minia-
turized, uncontaminated and perfectly accurate) technology, with physical and chemical 
processes for etching micro patterns on the surface of silicon slices, and modifying conductive 
properties in those patterns. Similar technology can also be used for the deposition of thin layers 
on surfaces for other purposes, such as hardening materials, coating photovoltaic cells or the 
production of sensors. Thus, the technology of chips production is a ‘platform’ technology, 
which contributes to other products than chips, which might fit well in Philips product portfolio. 
To keep such future options open, chips production may have be seen as part of core 
competence. 
 
The hypothesis concerning ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ entails that greater uncertainty in 
an industry, in terms of the volatility of technology and markets, yields a greater need to engage in 
outside relations with other organizations, to correct for the myopia of organizational focus. Thus, the 
hypothesis entails that in such industries there will be more outside relations, in inter-firm alliances for 
innovation and technical development. This is contrary to the hypothesis from transaction cost 
economics (TCE) that in the presence of transaction-specific investments increased uncertainty yields 
an incentive to integrate activities under a single ‘hierarchy’ (Williamson, 1975, 1985). The argument 
from TCE is that the dependence resulting from specific investments yields a risk of ‘hold-up’, which 
is difficult to control between firms under conditions of uncertainty concerning contingencies of 
contract execution, and easier to control under conditions of managerial fiat, in a hierarchy, which 
yields more scope for demanding information for monitoring, and for resolving conflicts of hold-up. I 
do not deny that argument. However, I propose that from the theory of learning used here there may be 
an overriding argument in favor of outside relations, for the sake of external economy of cognitive 
scope. The problem of hold-up that may arise from specific investments then has to be resolved by 
relational governance, which reconnects our theory with TCE.  
The hypothesis of an increased need for alliances under conditions of volatility has been confirmed 
by Colombo and Garrone (1998). They analyzed the strategies of telecommunication carriers in the 
early ‘90s and found that in Internet services and content, where technology and demand uncertainty 
were especially high, the relative rate of alliance formation was higher than in other communication 
industries characterized by absence of such extreme uncertainty. In addition, in the former industries a 
large share of the alliances established by telecommunication carriers had an inter-sectoral nature, 
linking them with firms from a variety of industries; this suggests that external economies of cognitive 
scope may have played a key role in alliance formation.  
 
Mergers/acquisitions or alliances? 
 
There are many forms of IOR’s, which vary along a number of dimensions: number of participants, 
network structure, and type and strength of ties, including ownership and control. Here, the literature 
benefits from extensive network analysis in sociology. Network structure includes features such as: 
density, centrality, and structural holes. Ties may have wide or narrow scope, depending on the range 
of activities included in them. Strength of ties has a number of dimensions: frequency of contact, 
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duration, size of investments, specificity of investments, and openness of communication. For a 
systematic discussion, see Nooteboom (2004). Here, only a key question is discussed, related to the 
boundaries of the firm: when do firms engage in integration, in merger or acquisition (MA), and when 
do they keep distance, in alliances between formally independent organizations? This section analyses 
this choice both normatively, i.e. in terms of what is good for the firm, depending on conditions, and 
descriptively, i.e. according to what choices are actually made, and why.  
Note that an MA entails integration in the legal entity of one organization. Within that 
organization, it might allow for high degrees of decentralization. Table 1 summarizes the argument for 
the alternatives of an MA and an alliance. 
 
------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Overall, the argument for integration, in an MA, is that it yields more control, in particular of hold-
up and spillover risk, and of present and future core competencies. For hold-up, the argument comes 
from TCE. Within a firm, under the grasp of ‘administrative fiat’, in an employment relation, one can 
demand more information for control and one can impose more decisions than one could in respect of 
an independent partner. A similar argument applies to spillover risk: one can monitor and control 
better what happens to information. Of course, even within organizations this may not be easy, as a 
result of asymmetric information, tacit knowledge, and mis-aligned incentives and motivations. 
However, under the legal umbrella of a firm, one has more opportunities than between different firms.  
As discussed earlier, an argument for integration may also be that one needs to maintain control of 
activities or resources that are complementary to core competencies, i.e. are needed to utilize them or 
to appropriate their advantages, or that are needed to retain options for future core competencies. The 
example was given of the chips division of Philips Company. Philips might have to hold on to it since 
it appears to be a platform technology for a range of potential future markets. Another possible 
argument is that that one may need to retain a certain capability in an outsourced activity to be able to 
judge its quality, for the selection and governance of outside relationships. However, there may be 
ample opportunities to maintain options for future core competencies in alliances. And capability of 
judging supplier quality may be derived from a joint benchmarking service, in the industry.      
The take-over of a young, dynamic, innovative firm may serve to rejuvenate an old firm 
(Vermeulen and Barkema 2001). In a growing new firm, the entrepreneur often has to turn himself 
around to the role of an administrator, or hire one, to delegate work and institute formal structures and 
procedures for the coordination of more specialized activities in large-scale production and 
distribution. He may not be able or willing to do that, and it may be to the benefit of the firm when it is 
taken over by a firm with a better managerial capability. However, it may be more likely that the 
entrepreneurial dynamic of the small firm gets stifled in the bureaucracy of the acquirer, in which case 
it should stay separate.     
Overall, the argument for an alliance is that it allows partners to maintain more focus of core 
competence, more flexibility of configuration and more variety of competence for the sake of 
innovation and learning. The flexibility argument derives from rigidities in re-arrangement of 
activities within organizations. This varies across business systems: it is less in the US than in 
continental Europe and Japan. Hence, network structures of firms are more needed in the latter regions 
(Nooteboom 1999c).  
Also, as recognized in TCE, an independent firm that is responsible for its own survival will be 
more motivated to perform than an internal department that is assured of its custom. Another great 
advantage of an alliance is that it entails fewer problems of clashes between different cultures, 
structures and procedures, in management, decision making, remuneration, labour conditions, 
reporting procedures and norms of conflict resolution, which often turn out to be the biggest obstacles 
for a successful MA. Of course such clashes can also occur in alliances, but less integration still entails 
fewer problems of integration.   
There is an argument of scale for both forms. In production, many economies of scale have been 
reduced, e.g. in computing. However, there is still economy of scale in, for instance, distribution 
channels, communication networks, network externalities and brand name. For integration, the 
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argument of scale is that one pools volume in activities in which one specializes. For outsourcing, the 
argument is that for activities that one does not specialize in, an outside, specialized producer can 
collect more volume, producing for multiple users. That may also offer more opportunities for 
professional development and career to staff that are specialized in that activity.  Note the argument 
from TCE that if assets are so dedicated that a supplier can produce only for the one user, the scale 
argument for outsourcing disappears.  
There is an argument of economies of scale or scope for integration only if they are inseparable 
(Williamson 1975). It depends how systemic rather than stand-alone activities are (Langlois and 
Robertson 1995).  
 
One form of economy of scope is that different activities share the same underlying fixed cost, 
for example of R&D, management and administration, communication network or brand 
name. When one of the activities is dropped, the utilization of fixed costs may drop. However, 
this is not necessarily so. It may be possible to share such overhead with others, as happens, 
for example, in ‘incubators’ for small firms, or collaboration in an R&D consortium.  
 
From the perspective of brand image there are arguments for both integration and separation. In an 
alliance there may be too great a risk that the image or quality of a brand allotted to partners will not 
be maintained sufficiently scrupulously. On the other hand, it may be better to maintain an 
independent, outside brand, to preserve its local identity. 
 
 The Dutch RABO bank years ago wanted to move into consumer credit, but felt that it would 
detract from its brand identity, which was associated with savings accounts, and therefore consu-
mer credit was offered by a separate subsidiary with a different name (‘Lage Landen’). 
However, years later consumer credit had become a normal product, required in the product 
range of any bank, and RABO incorporated the ‘Lage Landen’ under its own name.  
 Staying with the RABO bank, an illustration of reinforcing one’s product range by pooling 
complementary products is the cooperation between RABO, who offered a personal securities 
investment service through its advisors, and ROBECO, who offered a security investment fund 
to which consumers could subscribe by phone, without intermediaries. The two were pooled to 
yield a full line of service. 
 
Finally, there are reasons of default. One is that one would like to take one form but it is not 
available, because a partner is only available for the other form, or because it is forbidden by 
competition authorities. 
 
In the airline business, for example, MA are problematic for reasons of national pride and 
interest, perhaps strategic military reasons, and the fact that landing rights are nationally 
allocated. 
 
Another default is that one would like to take over only part of a larger firm, but it is not separately 
available for takeover, without the rest, in which one is not interested because it would dilute core 
competence. Another is that one cannot judge the value of a take-over candidate and needs some 
period of collaboration in an alliance to find out. Previously, value could more easily be judged by 
adding up values of material assets than now, when intangibles such as brand name, reputation, skills 
and knowledge are often more important, and difficult to value.    
Clearly, the choice between MA and alliance is quite complex. If one wants a simpler, general rule 
of thumb, it is as follows: consider full integration, in an MA, only if the partner engages in the same 
core activities in the same markets. In all other cases, i.e. when activities and/or markets are different, 
the rule of thumb suggests an alliance. According to this rule, what one would expect, on the whole, is 
vertical disintegration and horizontal integration.   
 
 In banking, increase of efficiency in an MA can, for example, be achieved by eliminating one of 
two branch offices (or automatic teller machines) in locations where both banks are represented. 
Threshold costs in specialized knowledge of specific industries and in setting up ICT networks 
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and databases can be shared. Reserves to cover risks of defaulting customers can be shared and 
spread. In an MA between banking and insurance there are economies of scope in the utilization 
of branch offices, ICT networks, advertising, customer relations. Such economy is further 
enhanced by adding travel bookings. In MA’s in banking, insurance and accounting an import-
ant motive also is the building of a worldwide network of offices from different companies 
pooling their offices in different continents, in order to yield global service to global customers. 
However, here one could ask whether the same objectives could not be achieved in an alliance, 
with the added advantages associated with that.  
 
There are four theoretical arguments for the rule of thumb. First, in horizontal collaboration, with 
the same activities in the same markets, partners are direct competitors, and it is most difficult to 
control conflict without integration. The game is more likely to be zero-sum. The temptation to exploit 
dependence is greatest. There is a threat of direct rather than indirect spillover. Second, in horizontal 
collaboration core competence is more similar, so that integration does not dilute it too much. Third, 
here the cognitive advantages of alliances are less: the diversity in knowledge is already minimal, with 
small cognitive distance, and thus there is less need to preserve it by staying apart. Fourth, with the 
same products, technology and markets, differences in culture, structure and procedures are likely to 
be minimal. Of course, they can still be substantial.  
 
 The Dutch steel corporation (‘Hoogovens’) a long time ago undertook a merger with the 
German colleague. After ten years of struggle it was broken up again, because attempts to 
integrate the two companies remained unsuccessful. Ten years after that, in Hoogovens there 
were still two rival camps, of those who had supported the merger, and were reproached that the 
failure was their fault, and the opponents, who were blamed by the proponents for having 
sabotaged the merger. Ten years after that, Hoogovens merged with British Steel, in CORUS. At 
present (March 2003), that merger is about to collapse, due to a conflict of interest. The British 
side has suffered from a more senescent technological outfit and a high exchange rate for the 
pound. To generate funds for restructuring, the British leadership of CORUS wanted to sell off a 
Dutch aluminium subsidiary, but this was blocked by the supervisory board of the Dutch branch, 
which was challenged by the British, in front of a Dutch court, which ruled that the Dutch action 
was legal. This reflects, among other things, a different view of corporate governance.  
 
One important qualification of the rule of thumb is the following. The overlap of activities and 
markets, which would favour integration, does not concern the situation prior to collaboration, but 
afterwards. In other words, if collaboration would lead to such overlap, integration may be needed 
before that overlap arises. In other words, one should look not at current but at intended core 
competencies.   
The argument for the rule of thumb is not only theoretical. Bleeke and Ernst (1991) showed 
empirically that when this rule is applied, the success rate of both MA and alliances rises substantially. 
If for a given method of measurement the success rate is less than 50 % without the rule, success rises 
to 75 % with the rule, for both MA and alliances. However, the rule given above is only a rule of 
thumb, to which there are exceptions. For more detailed analysis one can use Table 1, with the 
corresponding logic set out above. 
Next to good reasons for MA, alliances and outsourcing, there are also reasons that are bad, in the 
sense that they are not in the interests of the firms involved. One such reason is the bandwagon effect: 
one engages in a practice because it is the fashion to do so. When a practice becomes established, the 
drive for legitimation may yield pressure to adopt it without much critical evaluation. Another reason 
is a prisoner’s dilemma that applies especially to MA: if one does not take over one may be taken 
over, which may yield a loss of managerial position, so one tries to be the first to take over, even 
though it would be best for all to stay apart. Another reason is managerial hubris: managers want to 
make a mark and appear decisive or macho. This also applies especially to MA’s: those are quicker, 
more visible and dramatic than collaboration between independent firms. There is also the often-
illusory presumption that a take-over is easier than an alliance. Subsequently, however, the MA often 
fails due to problems of integration and has to be disentangled again. Even speed is a dubious 
argument. It may on the surface seem that an MA is in place faster than an alliance, for which one 
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must negotiate longer and set up an elaborate system of ‘bilateral governance’. However, the speed of 
an MA is misleading: the decision may be made quickly, but the subsequent process of integration is 
often much slower and more problematic than assumed. An alliance is often better even if in the 
longer run a takeover is the best option, to allow for the process of trust development, discussed 
before. Also, it yields the option to retract when failure emerges, without too much loss of investment. 
Bad reasons of bandwagon effects, managerial hubris or macho behaviour, and career profile may also 
thwart alliances. However, here the damage is more limited, and it is easier to retrench when failure 




The earlier analysis shows that in addition to the usual instruments to govern risk of opportunism, 
taken from TCE, there are also sources of trust that go beyond them. The first include hierarchical and 
legal control, mutual dependence, hostages, and reputation. The latter include ethical norms and values 
in the institutional environment, and the building of relation-specific norms, empathy, identification 
and routinization. Table 2 gives a survey of instruments, which includes instruments for the governance 
of both hold-up and spillover risk. Every instrument also has its drawbacks, which are also specified in 
the table.  
 
----------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
The first instrument entails a cop-out. In view of relational risk, hold-up is avoided by not engaging 
in dedicated investments, and spillover is avoided by not giving away any sensitive knowledge. The 
opportunity cost of this is that one may miss opportunities to achieve high added value in the 
production of specialties by investing in collaboration and learning with partners. The second 
instrument is integration in a merger or acquisition (MA), with the advantages and drawbacks 
discussed in the previous section. 
 Below the line, in Table 2, there are instruments for alliances between formally autonomous 
organizations, where one accepts risks of dependence due to specific investments and of spillover, and 
seeks to control them by other means than full integration in one organization. 
One option is to maintain multiple partners, in order not to become dependent on any one of them, and 
to demand exclusiveness from any partner, to prevent spillover. However, maintaining relations with 
alternative partners entails a multiplication of costs in dedicated investments and the governance 
needed to control the risks involved. Exclusiveness entails that in the specific activity involved one 
forbids the partner to engage in relations with one’s competitors. The first problem with this is that the 
demand of exclusiveness forbids the partner what one allows oneself: partnerships with the partner’s 
competitors. By having those relations one increases the spillover risk for partners. As a result, none of 
them may be willing to give sensitive information, which degrades their value as sources of 
complementary competence and learning. Furthermore, the demand for exclusiveness blocks the 
variety of the partner’s sources of learning, which reduces his value as a partner in learning, at a 
cognitive distance that is maintained by his interaction with outside contacts. Hence one should 
consider whether spillover is really a significant risk, as discussed before. If it is not, all parties can 
gain from maintaining multiple partners, perhaps for maintaining bargaining position, but especially 
for maintaining variety of sources of learning and flexibility of configurations.  
 A second instrument is a contract, in an attempt to close off ‘opportunities for opportunism’, by 
contracts. The problem with this instrument is fourfold. First, it can be expensive to set up. Second, it 
can be ineffective for lack of possibilities to monitor compliance, due to asymmetric information. Even 
if one can properly assess the execution of agreements, especially small principals may not be in a 
position to credibly threaten litigation, due to the economies of scale involved. A scale effect arises when 
the risk, effort and cost of litigation are large relative to the damage involved. Third, contracts have 
limited feasibility because of uncertainty concerning future contingencies that affect contract 
execution. This applies especially when the purpose of collaboration is innovation. Finally, detailed 
contracts for the purpose of closing off opportunities for opportunism express distrust, which can raise 
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reciprocal suspicion and distrust, with the risk of ending up in a vicious circle of regulation and 
distrust that limits the scope for exploration of novelty and obstructs the build-up of trust as an 
alternative approach to governance. 
 Another approach is to aim at the self-interest of the partner and limit incentives to utilize any 
opportunities for opportunism left by incomplete contracts. These instruments have been mostly 
developed in TCE. Self-interest may arise from mutual dependence, in several ways. One is that the 
partner participates more or less equally in the ownership and hence the risk of dedicated assets.  
A second approach to self-interest is to use one’s own dedicated investments to build and offer a 
unique, valuable competence to the partner. Thus, the effect of dedicated investments can go in 
different directions: it makes one dependent due to switching costs, but it can also make the partner 
dependent by offering him high and unique value. This instrument can yield an upward spiral of value, 
where partners engage in a competition to be of unique value for each other. 
Dependence also arises from a hostage, as also suggested by TCE. One form of hostage is minority 
participation, where one can sell one’s shares to someone who is eager to undertake a hostile take-over 
the partner. A more prevalent form is sensitive information. Here, the notion of hostage connects with 
the notion of spillover. One may threaten to pass on sensitive knowledge to a partner’s competitor. 
Reputation also is a matter of self-interest: one behaves well in order not to sacrifice potentially 
profitable relations with others in the future.  
The limitation of instruments aimed at self-interest is that they are not based on intrinsic 
motivation, and require monitoring, which may be difficult, especially in innovation. Furthermore, 
balance of mutual dependence is sensitive to technological change and to the entry of new players that 
might offer more attractive partnerships. Hostages may die or may not be returned in spite of 
compliance to the agreement. Reputation mechanisms may not be in place, or may work imperfectly 
(Hill 1990, Lazaric and Lorenz 1998). They require that a defector cannot escape or dodge a 
breakdown of reputation, e.g. by selling the business or switching to another industry or another 
country. It requires that complaints of bad behavior be checked for their truth and be communicated to 
potential future partners of the culprit. 
 Beyond self-interest, one may also appeal to more intrinsic motives that determine ‘inclinations 
towards opportunism’. This yields the role of trust, discussed above. Another possibility is to employ 
the services of a third party or ‘go-between’, which will not be specified here. 
One will generally select some combination of mutually compatible and supporting instruments from 
the toolbox of governance, and the use of a single instrument will be rare. There is no single and 
universal best recipe for governing IOR’s. The choice and effectiveness of instruments depend on 
conditions: the goals of collaboration, characteristics of the participants, technology, markets and the 
institutional environment. 
 For example, there is no sense in contracts when the appropriate legal institutions are not in place 
(lack of appropriate laws), or are not effective (police or judiciary are corrupt), or when compliance 
cannot be monitored (for lack of accounting procedures). When technology is flexible, so that one can 
produce a range of different specific products with one set-up, the specificity of investments and hence 
the problem of hold-up is limited. Possibilities of spillover are constrained when knowledge is tacit, 
and do not matter when technology changes fast. Reputation mechanisms don’t work when there are 
ample exit opportunities for defectors. Trust is difficult in a distrustful environment, where cheating 
rather than loyalty is the norm.  
 Innovation has its special conditions. Exchange of knowledge is crucial, with corresponding risks 
of spillover. Especially in innovation, the competencies and intentions of strangers are difficult to 
judge. Relevant reputation has not yet been built up. Uncertainty is large, limiting the possibility of 
specifying the contingencies of a contract. Specific investments are needed to set op mutual 
understanding. There is significant hold-up risk. Detailed contracts would limit the variety and scope 
for the unpredictable actions and initiatives that innovation requires. Under these conditions, trust is 
most needed to limit relational risk. An additional problem with contracts is that they may obstruct the 
building of trust. This does not mean that there are or should be no contracts at all. Indeed, there will 
almost always be some form of contract. However, they should then not be too detailed with the 
purpose of controlling hold-up risk. 
 Especially in innovation, a productive combination of instruments is mutual dependence 
complemented by trust, on the basis of an emerging experience in competent and loyal collaboration. 
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Trust is needed besides mutual dependence, because the latter is sensitive to changing conditions. 
Trust is more difficult under asymmetric dependence because the more dependent side may be overly 
suspicious (Klein Woolthuis 1999), in the so-called ‘Calimero syndrome’. In all this, go-betweens can 
help. Without them the building of trust may be too slow.  
 In the literature, contracts and trust are primarily seen as substitutes. Less trust requires more 
contracts, and detailed contracts can obstruct the building of trust. However, this view is too 
simplistic. Trust and control can also be complements (Das and Teng 1998, 2001, Klein Woolthuis 
1999, Klein Woolthuis et. al. 2003). First of all, as discussed above, trust has its limits, and where 
trusts ends contracts begin. Second, there may be a need for an extensive contract, not so much to 
foreclose opportunities for opportunism, but to serve as a record of agreements in a situation where 
coordination is technically complex. Third, a simple contract may provide the basis for building trust, 
rather than being a substitute for it. Fourth, one may need to build up trust before engaging in the costs 
and risks of setting up an extensive contract. This risk may include a spillover risk: in the course of 
negotiation much information gets divulged for partners to assess each other. Finally, a contract may 
be psychological and serve to flag trust, and signing a contract may constitute a ritual of agreement.  
Perhaps the most important point is that relationships should be seen as processes rather than 
entities that are instituted and left to themselves. Conditions may change. A frequent problem is that a 
relationship starts with a balance of dependence, but in time the attractiveness of one of the partners 
slips, due to slower learning, appropriation of his knowledge by the other partner, institutional, 
technological or commercial change.  
 Choice of instruments for governance may be constrained. Options depend on the structure of the 
networks one is in, and on one’s position in them. Coleman (1988) proposed that a dense structure 
with strong ties enables the build-up of reputation, the formation of coalitions, and social capital, in 
the form of trust and social norms. This helps governance, but also constrains actions. 
 Strong ties, in the sense of high frequency and intensity, and long duration, yield shared experience, 
which reduce cognitive distance, and enable the development of empathy and identification.
10
  These 
help governance, but can weaken competence building, in the elimination of cognitive distance needed 
for learning. Dense networks with strong ties can also yield inefficiencies due to redundant ties, and 
rigidities due to lock-in into the network, with exit prevented by coalitions of network members. Thus, 
IOR’s may yield rigidity. As a result, ending a relationship may be as important, and arguably more 
difficult, than beginning one. A more detailed analysis of the process of relationship development is 
beyond the scope of this chapter (see Nooteboom 2004).  
                                                     
10
 McAllister 1995, Lewicki and Bunker 1996. 
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Figure 1.1: Optimal cognitive distance 
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Table 1 Reasons for an MA or alliance 
 
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    MA (integration)      Alliance (keeping distance)  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Efficiency inseparable economy of scale economy of scale in non-core 
      in core activities       activities 
    inseparable economy of scope motivating force of independence 
         lower costs & risks of integration 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Competence maintain appropriability,   maintain focus on core competence 
     options for future competence 
    spillover control     maintain diversity, cognitive distance 
    rejuvenation       maintain entrepreneurial drive  
    provide management for 
      a growing firm  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Positional control hold-up risk    maintain flexibility    
advantage control quality brand name  maintain local identity/brand of partner 
    protect other partners from  
     spillover 
    ensure against take-over    
keep out competition  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
By default partner only available in MA  partner only available in alliance 
    difficulty of evaluating a   interest only in part of a partner   
  take-over candidate 
    collusion forbidden by    MA forbidden by 
      competition authorities    competition authorities  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Rule of thumb in case of same core    in case of complementary competencies 
     competencies  same    markets 




Table 2 Instruments of governance, and their drawbacks 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instrument     Drawback 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Risk avoidance:  lower added value, with lesser product differentiation (in  
no specific investments,  case of dedicated technology), 
no knowledge transfer  no learning, 
 
Integration:     less flexibity, variety, motivation,  
MA        problems of integration (see Chapter 3)  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of partners: 
maintain alternatives  multiple set-up costs, spillover risk for partners 
demand exclusiveness  limitation of variety  learning 
 
Contracts:     problematic under uncertainty, can be expensive, 
        straight-jacket in innovation, can generate distrust 
 
Self-interest:    opportunistic: requires monitoring  and is sensitive to 
mutual dependence   change of capabilities, conditions,  and entry 
hostages,      of new players 
reputation 
 
Trust:       needs building up if not already present 
has limits, how reliable? relation between individual and  organisation 
 
Go-betweens:    may not be available, how reliable? 
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